Nowadays most of the malware applications are either packed or protected. This techniques are applied especially to evade signature based detectors and also to complicate the job of reverse engineers or security analysts. The time one must spend on unpacking or decrypting malware layers is often very long and in fact remains the most complicated task in the overall process of malware analysis. In this report author proposes MmmBop as a relatively new concept of using dynamic binary instrumentation techniques for unpacking and bypassing detection by self-modifying and highly aggressive packed binary code. MmmBop is able to deal with most of the known and unknown packing algorithms and it is also suitable to successfully bypass most of currently used anti-reversing tricks. This framework does not depend on any other 3rd party software and it is developed entirely in user mode (ring3). MmmBop supports the IA-32 architecture and it is targeted for Microsoft Windows XP, some of the further deliberations will be referring directly to this operating system.
Introduction
Most of the currently popular malware is runtime packed, encrypted or obfuscated. However not only malware is packed 1 , packers are also successfully used in other popular software applications mostly to defend against cracking and illegal copying.
Therefore solutions limited only to packer detection cannot typify whether a packed application is really a malware or not, because such assumption leads to large number of false-positives alerts. In other words this means that in most of cases detecting, analysing of packed binary code can be only performed after the payload is unpacked. Appending to various external sources [11, 6] about 79% of malware is packed, where the most popular packers are UPX (more then 50% of malware les), PECompact, Upack, tElock, Yoda's Crypter, FSG, PESpin, ASPack. Using packing programs causes a transform of original program into a packed program (the original code is compressed, encrypted or both). Each packed program is equipped with so called loader stub (restoration routine) which works before original program. The restoration routine task is to unpack (restore) original packed binary code and throw the execution to original entry point. Each packer typically provide its own loader stub which relies on usage of specic algorithms and because of that it's hard to create one ultimate unpacker which could handle dierent loader stubs. Furthermore some of the packers like tElock, PESpin, Yoda's Crypt are creating an armored loader stub, which takes an advantage of massive amounts of antidebugging, anti-reversing tricks and self-modifying code techniques.
Such protection techniques often cause a major inconvenience in the malware unpacking and analysis process. This paper will present the method for bypassing packed, obfuscated, armored layers and a couple of methods for nding original entry point (OEP). Author will also try to present unpacking mechanism used in MmmBop, its main goals, limitations and also other related work.
Main Goals
Like most of the currently known unpackers MmmBop was developed to fulll specic objectives, which are:
• nding original entry point (OEP) and stoping the execution at its place (instrument only the loader stub)
• bypassing the protection layers equipped with anti-reversing tricks, obfuscated and selfmodifying code, keeping high level of transparency (avoiding interferences)
As it was previously stated MmmBop is completely userland application and it does not interfere with the stability of operating system. It also does not use debugging API, virtual machine or emulation which signicantly decrease the risk of being detected. MmmBop uses dynamic binary instrumentation for tracing the execution ow, next section presents its general architecture.
Architecture
MmmBop consist of two separate modules: Injector and DBI Engine. Each of the modules will be presented in the next subsections.
Injector module
The main tasks of the Injector module are:
1. creating a suspended process of the target application (application to be unpacked) 2. loading DBI Engine into the process space 3. informing DBI Engine about current program entry point 4. throwing execution to the DBI generated block
It is important to notice that the entire injection process is done virtually without physical le modication. It especially prominent when the loader stub of the packer is aggressive and computes checksums from the originally packed le. Injector module consist of an own position independent stub, which performs the DBI Engine loading in the target process space. When the Injector work is done it terminates itself and resumes the target process.
DBI Engine
This module is in fact the heart of MmmBop. It is completely independent and does not rely on any other known dynamic binary instrumentation frameworks like DynamoRIO [1] or Pin [2] . Even though those two mentioned DBI frameworks are far more advanced when it comes to instrumenting normal applications (not packed), they were not designed to work with self-modifying, aggressive binary code. Pin authors claim that it supports self-modifying code, unfortunately the tests show that it is still unable to instrument many loader stubs -like the one produced by tElock or PESpin.
Furthermore it also contains some other logic errors which often make the instrumentation impossible and because of that it cannot be used in unpacking process directed for aggressive loaders (this will be discussed further in subsection 4.3). It appears that Saron [14] (an unpacking approach using Pin) is also unable to work with aggressive packers like tElock. Pin's engine is not open source so it is hard to locate potential errors and address a proper x. Keeping in mind the DBI limits presented above author managed to create own instrumentation framework, which was developed specically to instrument the loader stub.
General DBI Engine architecture is presented below ( Block (TIB) because otherwise the exception handlers (like the one used in basic block builder) will not get executed (and this should be considered as fatal).
Dispatcher
As it was previously stated special instrumentation is used for control transfer instructions to make sure MmmBop will retain control before executing new basic block. In fact in such situations the control retains to the Dispatcher element, which decides what to do next. Typically Dispatcher executes Basic Block Builder to create new basic block pointed by the original destination of control transfer instruction. After this is done execution is transfered to the newly generated cached code (of course after performing the context switch).
Besides the presented dispatcher, MmmBop uses few more to follow the original execution process correctly. Those dispatchers will be presented in next sections.
Exception Dispatcher
Causing (generating) exceptions is a very popular trick among PE le protectors. Typical scenario works as follows:
1. Setup Structured Exception Handler 2. Generate Exception (execution is thrown to SEH frame)
3. In SEH frame: check the EXCEPTION_RECORD [8] and CONTEXT [7] structures, basing on the values decide what to do next.
When the exception is generated the EXCEPTION_RECORD and CONTEXT structures are lled respectively. Whenever the exception will happen in the cached code, the ExceptionAddress and Context.Eip elds will be lled too, however they will point to the cached code not to the original address. Whenever loader stub makes use of those two values it is almost certain that the instrumentation process will fail. To address this issue MmmBop hooks the KiUserExceptionDispatcher [9] function, which is called before the execution of the actual structured exception handler. This gives MmmBop the opportunity to lter and x the ExceptionAddress entry from EXCEPTION_RECORD and Eip entry from CONTEXT structure. If the exception happened in cached code, MmmBop will calculate the corresponding location and update both of mentioned entries with pointer to original exception address (since both structures are located in writeable memory this is a fairy easy step). Unlike Saron no kernel module is developed to lter generated exceptions, this solution has it good and bad sides. Special care should be taken with hiding the hook more deeply since loader stub may look for it. However this solution worked perfectly with all tested packers.
3.2. 6 Continue Dispatcher
Some packers use NtContinue [13] 
Unpacking Issues
In this section author will try to describe some of the most important issues that were necessary to solve to make MmmBop eective. Sometimes to illustrate specic issue more deeply additional real world examples will be provided as well.
Instrumenting CALL
The CALL instruction saves procedure linking information on the stack (return address) and calls dened procedure. Besides the normal usage, self-modifying code uses this instruction to address relatively to the return address placed on the stack, this is often referred as CALL instruction at 0x004040D8 transfers the execution to 0x004040DD and simultaneously pushes the return address (0x004040DD) on the stack. This address is then loaded into EBX register (instruction at 0x004040DD) and increased with 0x12 (instruction at 0x004040E0). The EBX register (now containing 0x004040EF value) is used via the SUB instruction at 0x004040E3 to decode (self-modify) instruction bytes located at 0x004040EF. Therefore the return address must point to original code location, not the corresponding location in code cache, because even though the cached code does keeps the same program logic it is extended with instrumentation instructions and it is limited to one basic blcok. In other words the same decoding process in reference to cached code may provide other (unstable) results, so executing the instruction located at 0x004040E3 may be fatal in this case. MmmBop takes care of this situation and points the return address to the original location.
While working with self-modifying code it is good to not assume that like in normal application after every CALL instruction, RET instruction will be used to retain control. In such situations it is quite possible that the execution will never land to the return address stored by CALL in fact this is a pretty known trick for disabling the functionality of STEP OVER in debuggers.
Handling self-modifying code
Since MmmBop only processes one basic block at a time, instruction which modies memory corresponding to dierent basic block is simply ignored. However the problems start when an instruction modify memory in range of current basic block. This means that the basic block located in code cache does not correspond to the original one any longer (since it was modied) -and the general logic is probably changed. Most of aggressive protectors make use of this technique like PESpin (see Listing 2 -extended previous listing). 004040 Listing 2: STAGE1: Fragment of PESpin code, illustrating code before self-modication.
As it was previously explained instruction at 0x004040E3 will cause a memory modication pointed by EBX register 0x004040EF. Next instruction located at 0x004040E9 will also cause a memory modication to the area 0x004040EC. This will cause the modication of the basic block logic, now it presents following instructions (Listing 3) . Instruction located at 0x004040EC is completely dierent then the one before performing decoding process. In addition to subsection 4.1, if the return address placed by CALL instruction would be not faked properly, PESpin stub would use the wrong value for further unpacking process (this would result in fault).
To resolve such situations additional instrumentation was used. Typically there are two ways of facing such problems both rely on instrumenting instruction which refers to memory in write mode:
1. monitor memory writes and check if the destination memory is located in the range of original basic block
monitor memory writes and check if the original basic block checksum has changed
Both of the listed mechanisms are implemented in MmmBop and both are comparable in the terms of speed. First mechanism requires some additional code instrumentation since generally the requested memory address can not be statically calculated. After the execution of 'memory write instruction'
MmmBop dispatcher checks if it aected current basic block. When MmmBop detects such action, it breaks the current basic block and creates new one (starting after the last executed instruction). Second solution does not require additional instrumentation code for calculating the destination memory address. So after every creation of basic block, a checksum is generated from original code (here the partial Adler-32 3 [20] is used as a checksum algorithm). Every time memory write occurs in the basic block, the checksum is calculated one more time from the original basic block code and then it is compared with the previously calculated one. If there is a dierence the currently cached basic block is destroyed and next one is generated from the beginning of last instruction that caused the memory write. Current MmmBop implementation enables using one of the two presented methods. The speed comparison between those two mechanisms will be presented in Testimonials section (section 6).
On the side note it's obvious that Prefetch Input Queue (PIQ) [19] tricks like the one used in PESpin (REP STOSB instruction used to overwrite itself) have no inuence on MmmBop.
Prexes
Special care should be taken while instrumenting control transfer instructions which are encoded together with IA-32 prexes. Some of the prexes encoded together with control transfer instruction are used deliberately to cause exceptions (like for example LOCK (0xF0) or OPERAND-SIZE (0x66) prex). On the side note Pin tends to ignore such prexes, such assumption makes it vulnerable to such attacks.
Hardware breakpoints
The IA-32 architecture provides special sets of registers called debug registers, used by the processor for debugging purposes. Listing 4: Fragment of tElock restoration routine, which setups debug breakpoints.
Instructions at 0x00404129, 0x00404135, 0x00404141, 0x0040414D write the breakpoint location to the DR0-DR3 debug registers respectively. Instruction at 0x00404152 updates the DR6 registers and nally instruction at 0x00404159 enables four hardware breakpoints by setting the DR7 register bits. Since direct changes to debug registers require ring0 privileges, following code executes in the exception handler and it operates on the CONTEXT structure (ECX). The modied context is then passed to NtContinue function which applies it to the selected thread, after resuming the execution selected hardware breakpoints are set. After the CPU will execute instruction corresponding the breakpoint address EXCEPTION_SINGLE_STEP will be thrown. This exception is ltered by tElock exception handler and following code is executed (see Listing 5). Listing 5: Fragment of tElock restoration routine, which handles single step exceptions.
Whenever tElock handles single step exception, it increases the byte variable located at 0x00404118 (which is in fact a counter) and it resumes the execution afterwards. This counter value is used in the further parts of the unpacking process. Therefore whenever hardware breakpoints will not be hit the le will not be unpacked correctly. In this case when the cached code is executed instead of the original one it's obvious that the breakpoints will not be detected and the unpacking process will fail. To correctly handle such situations MmmBop monitors the context passed to NtContinue function and writes down all the enabled hardware breakpoints locations. Whenever the basic block builder meets the specied breakpoint location MmmBop simply links current instruction to the original breakpoint address. Because of this mechanism breakpoints are correctly handled and MmmBop retains the program control immediately after the exception is thrown.
OEP Finding
MmmBop may use dierent approaches directed for nding original entry point of the packed program.
Since it is able to instrument all the instructions which cause memory writes, techniques that rely on this approach (detecting the execution of previously written area) may be applied as well. Currently MmmBop focus on control transfer checks, so whenever the control is returned to a basic block located at specied memory range, MmmBop assumes the original entry points was reached. The memory range used in this process generally corresponds to the borders of rst section of the packed le. Since most of the packers do not erase such information this solution plays out quite well. From the other hand packers like uPack merge all of the original sections into one 4 , this requires some manual guessing of the down border of the original executable section. In the more hard situations it seems to be possible to deliver another assumption, like every unpacked program tends to use API functions delivered by the operating system or by additional libraries. Therefore the rst 5 Table 1 and also illustrated on the chart below ( Figure 2 ). The number of basic block transfers required by specied packer is presented in Where:
• U tACRC is the time required to unpack a le while using Adler-32 checksum approach 5 Author assumes that the API calls done by the loader stub are ignored. 6 Of course this may require developing a kernel module because native API [12, 4] may be used instead.
• U tInstr is the time required to unpack a le while using normal instrumentation (without the Adler-32 checksum) The results show that both methods used for detecting basic block modication (Adler-32 checksum or the instrumentation approach) produced comparable results. PESpin required the highest amount of time because it uses a lot of control transfers between the basic blocks. It should be obvious that time required for the unpacking process will increase proportionally to the size of packed code (since more iterations will be required to complete the restoration routine). Generally as for the initial MmmBop implementation the results are enough satisfying. 
Limitations
Most of the dynamic binary instrumentation solutions need to modify target process address space. Unfortunately this is unavoidable. Some more sophisticated packers may use this fact for detection purposes. However this may be not so easy to implement, because other software products (like antivirus solutions, rewalls) typically interfere with the target process address space as well (by injecting additional libraries and so on). Packers, especially commercial solutions must work on such machines too, so it is very unlikely such risky solution will be implemented for MmmBop detection. From the other hand packers based on Virtual Machines (VM) approach will not be aected by MmmBop solution. However, in such cases MmmBop may be used for recording the execution trace, which is often very helpful in the further unpacking process.
Related Work
There are a number of unpackers available nowadays, this section will try to describe most of the related ones:
• OllyBonE [18] is a plugin for OllyDbg [21] which relies on similar mechanism like PaX or Shadow Walker does. It changes the page memory protection of selected region (typically rst section) and waits until exception happens at that range. If the exception address (exception EIP) points somewhere inside the protected region then original entry point is found. On the side note similar approach for unpacking purposes was created before by author of this article. The engine was called dEPACKiT and was developed and announced earlier [3] -unfortunately it was not released to public. Unlike OllyBonE it was a completely ring3 application.
• Renovo [10] uses an emulated environment to monitor program execution and memory writes. As the emulated environment TEMU is used. Renovo tries to nd original entry point by detecting code execution from previously written memory.
• Paradyn Project [15] is a very similar approach to MmmBop. Paradyn uses dynamic binary instrumentation for analyzing packed binary code (it uses Dyninst for this purpose). However it appears to be directed for Unix operating systems and currently it cannot handle self-modifying code.
• Saron [14] also uses dynamic binary instrumentation technique (it uses Pin framework as the dynamic binary instrumentation framework) to monitor program execution together with monitoring memory writes. Additionally it uses hardware paging features in a similar way like OllyBonE and related mechanisms do. Because Saron relies on Pin framework it is unable to handle such aggressive packers like tElock, PESpin etc.
Future Work
MmmBop is an initial concept of generic unpacker, together with the evolution of the evading and anti-debugging techniques MmmBop must be constantly extended as well. Future MmmBop version should consider handling multi-threading loader stubs and cover more of the aggressive packers. It is quite possible that MmmBop can be quite more optimized the initial version was build without any additional optimizations.
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